Elizabeth A. Behnke, Ph.D. 

 Prologue

This report is situated-and not just because the individual who has prepared it is speaking-"from" a particular historical/cultural/social/personal context. Rather, it is equally situated by virtue of being conducted within a certain "attitude" and displaying a correlative "emphasis": namely, an emphasis on phenomenology as "research" rather than on phenomenological "philosophy" (an emphasis that is itself a shareable possibility-i.e., the possibility of taking up a certain attitude and approach to phenomenological work per se-rather than the property of any particular individual). However, let us also note that the very notion of "situatedness" (including work "situated" in terms of attitude and approach) already opens up a horizon of other possibilities, so that a "situated" report already points beyond itself to other ways in which others could perform the same task "otherwise." Thus to acknowledge that recognizing certain issues (and not others) as problems for phenomenology's next century can be traced back to the attitude(s), motivation(s), and interest(s) of the researcher(s) concerned does not at all mean that the "situated" report is "arbitrary"-just that it is provisional and open in principle to being enriched by contributions from other voices and other points of view.

Part One: Sample outstanding tasks and issues

I. In medias res

The phenomenological tradition itself, as experienced, is not a static sum of unalterable facts, but belongs to the open realm of meaning in-the-making: to consider it "prospectively" rather than "retrospectively" we must not only "look ahead," but take note of the way in which emerging work can shift the sense of the very past it is rooted in. Thus a prospective inquiry into phenomenological work pertaining to "embodiment" cannot avoid tackling the issue of the appropriation of work in the field to date, including the retroactive revision of work already done-for example, when a fresh description corrects or contextualizes an inherited one, perhaps thereby changing its validity-status from "accepted as canonic" to "revealed to have been provisional," or when an emerging line of inquiry transforms analyses formerly seen as "marginal" or "irrelevant" into important prefigurations of current investigations. In other words, we've arrived in the middle of something with its own dynamics and momentum, its own sedimented findings and modes of inquiry, and its own ongoing generative style. In some cases we are simply swept up in the movement of "work in progress," accepting the tradition's legacy of "unfinished business" as our own, while in other cases we are motivated "newly" and "differently." But in either case, how we carry the tradition forward affects how we see its past, so that the issues we currently see as "outstanding" will shape what we see as the "salient" features of our own phenomenological heritage. Four areas of engagement that I see as particularly crucial in this regard are identified below, and although I will discuss them in terms of their relevance for a phenomenology of embodiment, they may be applicable for other topics as well.

A. There is a need for a comprehensive "state of the art" survey of findings in the field to date, an endeavor that includes not only the scholarly research task of identifying and harvesting material from diverse sources (a task that is still especially important in the case of Husserl's own work on the body), but the practical work of making this material more accessible (including not only preparing bibliographies and indices, but also transcribing, editing, translating, and publishing source material). To mention just one of many possible examples, it is crucial for the future of this field that more of Husserl's D manuscripts become readily available. Inseparable from the issue of access to a fuller range of sources, however, is the evaluatory/educational task of assessing this work in light of the relevant Evidenz (i.e., in light of the experiencing in which whatever is at stake is there "itself," in "filled" rather than "empty" fashion).

B. Of special interest is developing a way of analyzing descriptive work in relation to-and as distinguishable from-two related but distinguishable contexts. On the one hand, we should consider the attitude(s) and the context(s) of motivation within which a given description was produced, since our way of posing a question shapes our access to it (e.g., our descriptions of "Normalität" and "Anomalität" will turn out differently depending on whether our research interest lies in the intersubjective constitution of the objectively "true thing," or in developing an embodied ethics of diversity and tolerance). On the other hand, we should also be alert to the attitude(s) and the context(s) of relevance within which the findings are typically taken up, noting, for example, what happens when findings won by descriptive methods are subjected to various sorts of "interpretation" in various contexts. Here too returning directly to the Evidenz is invaluable.

C. Methodological renewal is needed not only in order to encourage and facilitate the turn to Evidenz rather than the automatic/"blind" acceptance of and reliance upon inherited texts, but also in order to enable researchers to build effectively on the work of earlier researchers, not just by correcting it where needed, but by supplementing it with further original studies; in order to respond to styles and structures of bodily experience that may only now be emerging historically; and in order to develop methodological strategies for particular projects (e.g., to address "liminal" bodily experiences). Of particular interest is a "bodily" appropriation of certain familiar methodological "moves," so that we might wind up working within a "bodily epoché," a "kinaesthetic reduction" (Behnke 1997, 182), etc. Clarifying the aims and methods of a specifically mundane phenomenology of embodiment, in contrast to research in transcendental corporeality/intercorporeality, will also be helpful. Finally, there is also the issue of phenomenology as "action research"-for example, a transcendental inquiry that retrieves kinaesthetic consciousness from anonymity has enormous transformative potential when the results of descriptive work "flow back into" the lifeworld (Hua 6, 115, 141n.1) and affect reigning, marginalized, and emerging bodily practices.

D. Special problems arise in terms of the relations between "body" and "language." I have already mentioned the need to supplement signitive/textual-oriented work with renewed recourse to Evidenz. In addition, however, what is often needed in the case of bodily experience is a general project of "retrieval," giving voice to the often unnoticed and supposedly "ineffable," yet without burdening it with the dualistic heritage expressed, for instance, in such terms as "mind-body unity." Here further work along the lines already initiated by Eugene T. Gendlin will be invaluable in "speaking-from" the bodily and letting words "work newly" as necessary (e.g., allowing words to "work" in terms of an experiential distinction they point to, without automatically co-assuming every inherited nuance of the word in question, be these nuances "everyday" or "philosophical"). Finally, there is much need for further clarity and precision in nomenclature. Even seemingly "classic" terms such as "Leib" and "Körper" are not always used uniformly. But rather than attempting to impose some canonic uniformity, "local" usages should be thematized, both as variants that can point to invariants and as special ways of bringing out features or distinctions that have not been addressed in other contexts. And concrete examples should be used to facilitate recourse to Evidenz in each case. Candidates for such treatment include not only the Leib/Körper cluster, but the very notions of "the" body and "embodiment"; terms such as aisthesis, hylé, affection, Empfindnisse, and the "pathic"; the distinction between "kinaesthesis" and "sensations of movement"; the cluster of "Null-" terms (e.g., the null-"point" of visual experience in contrast to the null-"position" of kinaesthetic experiencing); the word-field/conceptual field summoned by such terms as absent, tacit, implicit, marginal, operative, "functioning," pre-reflective, pre-objective, passive, and anonymous; the cluster concerning transcendental corporeality, kinaesthetic consciousness, and the body-as-constituting/body-as-constituted distinction; and the language proper to a qualitative (bodily) alternative beyond (bodily) intentionality, be it termed reflexivity, "self-affection," Urbewußtsein, "lucid awareness," etc.

II. Auf die Phänomene selbst zurückzugehen (Hua 16, 9)

A. "Whose body" does a phenomenological inquiry into the styles and structures of bodily experience take as paradigmatic?

1. If we are seeking invariants at a higher degree of universality, have we truly considered a rich enough range of "found variants" (cf. Wilshire 1982, 20, where the term is "given variations," in contrast to imaginative ones), or have we fallen prey to a "premature universalization"? Consider, for example, gendered embodiment; ethnic bodies, intercultural bodies, bodies of varying social status (e.g., economic class, incarceration); compromised bodies, prosthetic bodies, virtual bodies; violated bodies; interspecies embodiment; extraordinary modes of embodiment (e.g., in athletic, artistic, and spiritual practices); other liminal bodies (e.g., dissociated modes of embodiment, embodiment in dreams, modes of embodiment in emergencies); and so on.

2. On the other hand, we may choose to focus on each of these "different bodies" as different, giving voice to what is distinctive to each type and expanding the range of structures found rather than taking bodily diversity solely as a source of "variants" in service of the cognitive project of identifying a single, warranted set of "more generous" common denominators or invariants. (Such work could, for example, fit into Husserl's notion of a "transcendental aesthetic" as a "transcendental empiriography" concerned with the relative concordance of different home-worlds as well as with the critique of "universal" experience and the "Zwischenheimatliche"-see Hua 15, 234-36).

3. We may also find that taking the issue of "whose body" into consideration will further expand or alter the type of research questions asked because both the usual context(s) of motivation and the typical context(s) of relevance are cast in a new light when "which body" becomes an issue. For example, not all phenomenological research into the lived body need focus on the "everyday" body as it is typically lived in post-industrial society; if we direct our attention to the "mindful bodies" fostered in various other traditions, we realize that we are researching a "dimension" of embodiment that can be lived in more than one way. And the choice of "which body" will function as a "leading clue" or paradigm case has important implications not only when we choose the specific research questions to be addressed, but also when descriptions of "the" body or of embodied experience are adduced in service of broader philosophical claims.

4. Of special urgency in this regard are themes of bodily normality/abnormality/anomaly; normalization and marginalization; "normality" as "status quo" or as "emerging" Einstimmigkeit; "normality" as telos toward optimality; transformative somatic practices, possibilizing, and social change.

5. Finally, we may specifically ask the question "whose body" of the researcher's own body as an "informed body," not just in terms of having undergone certain types of bodily experience within the natural attitude or having developed skills pertaining to certain types of bodily activities, but in terms of his/her general development of an "appropriate sensibility" (Sokolowski 1974, 108­109) for the experiential evidence pertaining to the research theme in question. But this already suggests another area of concern.

B. Modes of bodily awareness

1. In one familiar version of the inherited phenomenological tradition, one's own body is normally "passed over in silence" (Sartre 1943, XXX)-i.e., it is an operatively functioning body anonymously and pre-reflectively geared in with the world (Merleau-Ponty 1945), a non-conscious but "absently available" body schema (Gallagher 1986); in everyday life, it usually only becomes salient when it breaks down (and then it is most typically constituted as the naturalized body of mainstream biomedical practice), although it can also become an "object" of "reflection," a procedure often interpreted as a species of self-alienation. I find that it is still imperative to demonstrate an alternative style of awareness that might be termed the "lucidly lived" body (cf. Behnke 1984/1990). Such a mode of experience might also be termed bodily "reflexivity," following the terminology in Mohanty 1972, 153ff.; however, in recent years there has been a tendency for the word "reflexivity" to be assimilated to the structure of "reflection" (cf., e.g., Hopkins 1989). But whatever the best nomenclature turns out to be, one key to realizing this possibility leibhaft will be to take kinaesthetic consciousness rather than visual experience as paradigmatic.

2. Some work has indeed been done in contrasting structures of sensory fields (e.g., visual vs. audial-cf. Straus 1966, 4­11,285), but there is much to be done in differentiating and describing varieties of touch (e.g., erotic, instrumental, compassionate) and of "touching-through." This is not only of great theoretical/practical importance to "hands-on" body-oriented professions (e.g., nursing, physical therapy, transformative somatic practice), but also points to yet another area for further research-namely, intercorporeal experience.

C. Although the notion of "intercorporeity" is often exploited conceptually, there are relatively few studies focusing on intercorporeity as an actual experience. We could study, for example, healthy and toxic intercorporeity; heightened intercorporeal embodiment in such areas as music and athletics; the relation of kinaesthetic autonomy and interkinaesthetic responsivity; the sedimentation of body/movement possibilities in artifacts, places, and cultural practices; affective intercorporeity; and so on.

D. Body temporality is another area for more research. Issues here might include distinguishing the notion of "strata" of bodily presuppositionality from that of genetic-developmental "stages"; the relation of deeply sedimented styles of ongoingly "making a body" to possibilities of bodily indeterminacy, plasticity, spontaneity, and deep change; lucid awareness of primal motility at the "leading edge" where the "now" spills over into the "next" (cf. Behnke 2001), in contrast to the retentional body of affect as an occasion for ever-subsequent attention, so that "passive" bodily sensation is characterized as an "always actualizable inactuality" (cf. Depraz 1995, 274), giving rise to the problem of a temporal fissure between the "experiencer" and the "experienced" body; and (to acknowledge important work soon to be published by Anne Luise Kirkengen) the inscribed body, i.e., a body where a founding traumatic situation of violation is associatively bound with a strong sensuous "anchor" or a particular style of bodily "response," and the "reactivation of sediment" can take the form of reinstating the entire constellation when one "moment" of it is reawakened.

III. Issues pertaining to the "status" of the body

A. Natural science naively posits a body that constitutive phenomenology reveals as "naturalized," and this move of constitutive clarification helps liberate an experiential body. But in recent years, there is a tendency for some theorists to replace the notion of a body totally determined by nature with the notion of a body totally determined by history or by culture (see, e.g., Foucault 19XX, XX). Here several approaches could be helpful, e.g., a constitutive elucidation of this second "totalizing" move; eidetic research not only into such structures as "inferiorization" (Bartky 1990) and "shrinking before authorities" (Johnson 1983/1992), but also into alternative structures fostering bodily authenticity and empowerment (cf. Gendlin 1984); and concrete, phenomenologically-informed cultural-scientific investigations into the actual social shaping of bodies and modes of embodiment in given historical/cultural/social contexts (including research into the limits and leeway of such shaping).

B. There is still more to do concerning the status of the body vis-à-vis the "self," especially given the current interest in themes of "self-affection" and "alterity." Here Phyllis Sutton Morris's notion of "patterns of identifications and otherness," sketched out in her 1982 article of that title, could well be applied in conjunction with the distinction (Hua 4) between "mineness" as "possession" (with "sensations" counting as the first "possessions") and "mineness" as "act" (with kinaesthesis considered as something "quasi-volitional," in contrast to "sensations of movement"-cf. Cairns 1976, 64-but with the sphere of the "volitional" taken as belonging to the realm of the egoic in the broadest sense, including but not limited to the active, waking I-cf., e.g., Hua 14, 447, 450; Hua 15, 305).

C. Further related issues could be specified in terms of the bodily version of the paradox of subjectivity; the body-as-constituting/body-as-constituting distinction; the clarification of misunderstandings concerning the "contamination" of "pure" experience; and the strata of mundanization, including the interesting theme of the "localization" of kinaesthetic processes, as well as the theme of the constitution of one's own body as a proto­near-thing (and the concomitant emphasis in certain manuscripts of Husserl on the practical).

D. One of the most exciting areas for future research takes its cue from recognizing that Husserl's own descriptive work tended to focus on two chief paradigmatic examples: the "tone" and the "thing." He was much occupied by the ways in which one's own lived body can indeed be constituted as a thing, but even more occupied with ways in which it cannot be completely constituted as a thing (cf. Behnke 2000). The latter line of research could be complemented by investigating the body in terms of the paradigm of a tone, so that we are researching "bodying," or as Zaner (1964, 249) puts it, embodiment as "a continuously on-going act." What is important here, however-and this is true of the other issues pertaining to the "status" of the body as well-is that the research need not be guided by the aim of producing a single "definitive" account of, say, the ontological/metaphysical status of the body. Instead, it may be far more fruitful to trace each account to its constitutive conditions (i.e., to show from what standpoint, within what attitude, shaped by what motivations, assuming what method, under the sway of what paradigms, and in terms of what criteria a given account is experienced as "warranted"). In other words, although a plurality of seemingly "incompossible" accounts of the body and embodiment may pose problems for certain types of philosophical "systems," from a research standpoint, the diversity of accounts merely testifies to the richness and plurivocity of the phenomena themselves.

IV. Intersections with other fields of inquiry

A. A phenomenology of embodiment has enormous potential for contributing (or continuing to contribute) to many other disciplines or areas of study, including, e.g., somatics (both in terms of further developing a Husserlian "somatology" and in terms of ongoing interchange with those involved in transformative somatic practice); "neuroscience" (e.g., linking phenomenological description of styles of bodily awareness with biofeedback research, and cf. also Varela 1997 on the "naturalization of phenomenology"); medical anthropology and other cultural sciences (where phenomenological research into experiential possibilities "per se" can be used as the basis for empirical research into the actual occurrence of the phenomenon in question in a given population); primary health care practices, with special emphasis on the practical implications of work in phenomenology of the body for such areas as nursing and physical therapy (cf. Toombs ed., forthcoming); victimology (again, cf. the new work by Kirkengen); and peace studies.

B. What is needed in general to further such intersection? On the part of phenomenologists, open-mindedness (consider what the corresponding lived experience of "open-bodiedness" might be, and how it would communicate non-verbally); feeling comfortable in interdisciplinary contexts (note that doing eidetic phenomenological description helps develop the general ability to see patterns emerging across varied specific "circumstances"); the ability to guide others to the sorts of experiential evidence at stake in any given problem or issue, so that everyone involved can have firsthand, independent access to the phenomena themselves; and the appropriate skills for undertaking original phenomenological research into themes of concern to the colleagues in question.

V. Embodied ethics and the critique of corporeal experience

The phrase "critique of corporeal experience" is borrowed from Paci (1963; see, e.g., 1972, 467); I have been working on the notion of "embodied ethics" for a number of years, initially under the title of an "ethics of empathy" (Behnke 1989), subsequently using the phrase "embodied ethics" itself (see, e.g., Behnke 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999a). The latter phrase has also been employed by Gail Weiss (1999) as an equivalent to an "ethic of embodiment," and related issues have been addressed by Al Lingis in a number of works (19XX, 19XX, 19XX) focusing on the notion of a sensuous imperative (Weiss too speaks of a "corporeal imperative").

The context in which Paci uses the phrase has to do with "the critique of Kantian transcendentalism, interpreted as a transcendentalism that does not take into account sensitivity, corporeality, and aesthetic experience (transcendental aesthetic, in the Husserlian sense)," and is presented in conjunction with the themes of bodily expropriation ("since the Leib is always threatened by degradation to the level of Körper, it can become an objectified body by being exploited and fetishized by an exploiter"); feeling and living one's own body as "kinaesthetically active," so that "it is the possibility of having a prerogative that allows praxis"; and the transition from "a passive 'having of the world'" to an "awakened consciousness" that "overturns passivity into activity," not only through action proper, but also through the thematization that retrieves subjective/intersubjective achievements from anonymity-thus making an "authentic life" possible (Paci 1972, 44­46). To this we can link Don H. Johnson's extension of Mauss's notion of "techniques of the body" (Mauss 1968) to a contrast between bodily "technologies of alienation" and bodily "technologies of authenticity" (Johnson 1983/1992). Then in conjunction with the notion of "embodied ethics" we can understand this trajectory in terms of the theory and practice of the body of compassion, the body of tolerance, and the body of peace, as well as of a healthy intercorporeity admitting both autonomy and connectivity.

An example of a specific theoretical study yet to be worked out within embodied ethics would involve a critique of the notion of the "absent" body, characterizing it not as a "positive" pre-reflective anonymity to be interpreted in terms of a carnal metaphysics of the flesh of the world, but as a widespread social pathology identified by Thomas Hanna (1988) as chronic "sensory-motor amnesia." Such work would then not only be relevant in, for instance, discussions of the "unfelt body" of survivors of serious and explicit violations to bodily/kinaesthetic integrity and dignity, but would also be of value in the general critique of the reigning bodily "normality" within a given home-world. For example, we might ask who has to be numb to what sorts of bodily feelings for society as we know it to continue as is: the worker has to be numb to the brutalizing conditions of labor in order to be able to carry on and earn the paycheck (cf. Freund 1982, Ch. 7); the consumer has to be numb to "needs" or "desires" that are "native" to the lived body in order to be able to fall prey to advertising and spend the paycheck (cf. O'Neill 1985, Ch. 4); the commodified body of desire has to become numb to its (her, his) own kinaesthetic autonomy and integrity in order to comply with the rules of display that incessantly put us on trial before the eyes of the other (cf. Johnson 1977, Ch. 4; Bartky 1990, Ch. X); the compassionate, intercorporeal body has to become numb to a kind of basic "visceral" empathy in order to practice violation and violence, or survive it, or witness it unmoved (cf. Johnson 1983/1992, Ch. 6). Related issues might involve the theme of the inauthentic body colonized and defined by the "they"; the question of the styles of embodiment proper to an ethical cultural renewal (cf., e.g., Casey n.d.); and the role of an embodied ethics in restorative justice, in somatic peace-building, and in repairing and preserving the increasingly fragile fabric of civility.

In a speech in Toronto, Archbishop Desmond Tutu made an explicit connection between torture and abuse, as control of the body, and the way such obvious violations of human dignity are prepared by more general practices of bodily depersonalization and disempowerment (cf. the notions of bodily "inferiorization" and "colonization"). What is the opposite of this? And how can this "opposite" be brought to genuine itself-givenness? Is it even possible to move toward a "cruelty-free" society? Husserl speaks of the phenomenologist's "time-wings" (Hua 15, 239); to stretch his metaphor still further, can we take wing from the living present and contribute to a "phenomenology of what doesn't exist yet"? And if an embodied ethics can truly provide an alternative to an ethos of violence, what practical and educational measures are needed to implement this, and how can a phenomenology of embodiment further contribute to it?

Part Two: A sample contribution to the field

I.Excursus on method

How can I meaningfully report the results of my research to you unless you, too, can consult the relevant experiential evidence-the "phenomena themselves"-in a "filled" rather than "empty" way?

The typical strategy in descriptive-constitutive phenomenological work involves an "asking-back" or "tracing-back" (Rückfragen, Rückgang) that moves from the "ready-made" world to the anonymous achievements that are its hitherto unthematized correlate (cf. Hua 6, §29).

But what if the phenomenon I am studying is itself less of a ready-made "datum"? What am I to do if the phenomenon is unfamiliar to your? What if it is not yet accessible to you?

It is my contention that Husserlian phenomenological method can indeed be used for emerging experiential possibilities, not just sedimented ones, for marginalized phenomena as well as for canonic ones, for the ephemeral or the unnoticed as well as for what is typically stable and salient-in short, for unfamiliar as well as familiar experiences. And in investigating such phenomena, I find no essential difficulty in using descriptive phenomenological methods. To be sure, the task of description is not always easy, and often opens up more problems than it solves-or better, it horizonally opens, in varying degrees of determinacy, much more that is "yet-to-be-described." But if the scientificity of phenomenology, as method, rests on the possibility of intersubjective corroboration/confirmation/verification-or perhaps correction, cancellation, or contextualization-then the research report plays an especially crucial role in the case of "unfamiliar" phenomena.

Here I am assuming that all phenomenologists who count as "fellow-researchers" are committed to giving any phenomenological description an appropriately participatory "reading" (i.e., a reading in which the "empty words" are to be "redeemed" or "cashed in" for the phenomenon itself). However, where the fulfilling experiential evidence is not immediately obvious, or seems vague or elusive, the phenomenon must not only be described "universally enough" to allow independent access to it by way of various concrete exemplifications, but must also be specified "determinately enough" to locate the phenomenon in question and differentiate it from any others with which it could readily be confused.

Yet it still may not be enough to delineate essential features "of" a phenomenon in an appropriately "determinately universal" way; I may also have to describe how to gain access "to" it. This means describing not just the "how of the givenness," in a strictly literal way-i.e., "how it shows itself" in the sense of "what it looks like" or what its typical "modes of display" are-but the "how of the receivingness," i.e., the "how" on the part of the experiencer: what mode(s) and style(s) of awareness must be in play, in what attitude(s), for this phenomenon to be, precisely, a phenomenon, i.e., experienced?

In what follows, I'll begin with some experiential experiments that may help to guide fellow-researchers reading this report toward certain clusters of experiential possibilities by awakening or fine-tuning an "appropriate sensibility" for the type of phenomena in question. Then I'll offer some descriptive findings for such fellow-researchers to confirm and approve-or correct and improve. Of course, given the limits of the current format, the presentation will inevitably be provisional and incomplete. My aim, however, is not merely to provide a report "of" or "about" certain research findings, but to set up an occasion for their genuinely phenomenological demonstration. In other words, the descriptions below are offered as an "invitation to evidence" (Behnke 1997, 181ff.), as a "score" that is only brought to life when the reader actually performs the experiments and "cashes in" the empty words on the page for the relevant experiential evidence itself.

 

II. Preliminary experiments: finding the general terrain of the type of phenomena in question

A. Making the invisible visible

At the conference in Florida in January 2001 where much of the work in this volume was initially discussed, I began my live presentation with an experiential experiment drawn from the tradition of the field of somatics-more specifically, from the part of that tradition devoted to bodily awareness practices. To perform this experiment for yourself, you need a blank piece of paper and some crayons (or if you prefer, a box of colored pencils, or a supply of pens that have different colors of ink and form lines of different widths, or other artists' materials). The instructions are as follows:

Use the crayons (or other materials) to express on the paper what you feel right now in your back, just as you feel it from within-don't think about it, just do it and see what happens.

Here we might point out that although sensory modalities are indeed distinct, they not only point to one another intersensorially (cf., e.g., Hua 15, 245), but can present one and the same "structure" (e.g., a tone signal and a light signal can present the same "rhythm"-Hua 11, 415; cf. 180), and can thus have "presentational value" (Mickunas 1974) for one another: colors and inscribed gestures can give visible expression to qualitatively variegated somaesthetic sensings (Empfindnisse).

 

B. Making the visible invisible

Here the instructions are quite simple:

Imagine yourself invisible. (Many people find this experiment easier if they close their eyes; some imagine themselves becoming invisible all over at one stroke, while others prefer to imagine becoming invisible more gradually, e.g., first one's eyes, then one's head and neck, and so on-or, of course, in any order you please.)

Now-once you have imagined yourself invisible-let me ask:

Are you still experientially "there" for yourself? Do you have to touch yourself all over in order to find yourself, or can you feel yourself there, just sitting there, just as you are?

And where you are in contact with something, such as the surface that supports you, can you take the tactile sensations as "sensings" presentive of your own lived body rather than as "sensations" presentive of whatever it is you are touching?

Many writers have noted the hegemony of vision in Western culture; placing the visual realm in brackets can help develop an appreciation of the structures of, and the phenomena proper to, other sensory modalities, other "registers" of the corporeal "responsorium" (cf. Waldenfels 1994, 463 ff.). (As yet another example, one can try out the following experiential experiment: Move your hand to a location somewhere outside of your field of vision and wiggle your fingers, noticing the somaesthetic sensings, the feeling of doing this; then move your hand into your field of vision and repeat the movement while watching it. Does this change what you feel in your hand?)

After these preliminary experiments, let us turn to a sample phenomenological investigation, presented in terms of the experiential evidence pertaining to various "levels" that are at work in the constitution of the sensuously felt body. Our procedure will involve beginning with an "unbuilding" or "dismantling" (Abbau) to a certain stratum, then progressively "building up" (Aufbau) to the phenomenon, "my own lived body felt from within."

 

III. Hylé, Empfindnisse, field, and frame: An experiment in phenomenological practice (II)

A. We begin with a particular experiment in "dismantling" or "unbuilding" that already presupposes a nested series of unbuildings qua refrainings/reductions/discriminations (cf. Kersten 1989 §14). For example, we are already refraining from the general positing of the natural attitude in favor of sheerly experiencing what is there to be experienced, precisely as it is experienced, with a concomitant shift from the body as a material reality to the experiential body. Moreover-as I have already suggested in the second preliminary experiment above-we are also already refraining from taking haptic/tactile Empfindnisse as presentive of external things, but are instead taking them as presentive of the lived body, given in the special primordial mode that is only available, firsthand, to each embodied experiencer in his/her own particular case. But now a further unbuilding is at stake.

Here, then, are the instructions to reach the stratum in question:

Do not take the sensings as "presentive" (i.e., as "presentive of" anything at all, even your own body). In other words, our experimental procedure will be to withhold the "animating" apprehension, apperception, or sense-bestowal per se.

What remains? i.e., what persists as the residuum of this procedure, and how can it be described? Note that we are proceeding eidetically, i.e., we are relying on the twin moves of "exemplicating" and "exemplifying"-the initial researcher makes the "exemplicating" move (Zaner 1978, 6ff.), taking the concrete experience at the moment as an example "of" a more "generous" structure that could also be exemplified by other concrete experiences, and the fellow-researchers make the "exemplifying" move by attempting to find the features in question within their own current concrete experiencing:

qualitative "thereness";

"non-differentiated" (or "pre-differentiated," in the sense of "prior to but permitting of" differentiation) passive synthesis of association of "the same type" of event into "a" specific sensuous "dimension" (cf. Hua 11, §31, Beilage XIX)-a somaesthetic dimension of felt "mineness" that admits qualitative variation, but is itself more like a "global" or "general" possibility of "this general type of sensation" per se, a dimension of "Empfindnisse" of whatever type, prior to the constitution of any specific sensory "field" with "localization" of specific "sensa";

nevertheless, a "dynamic" character, with a certain "ongoingness," and incipient "saliencies" in the flow;

present-"for" (me), but the "locus" of the experiencing function (the "to-whom") is more "diffuse," less like, e.g., some sort of punctiformal "vanishing point" behind the eyes or in the "Hinterkopf" (Hua 16 227­28);

[for the present researcher], often interrupted by sudden spontaneous bodily movement-spontaneous kinaesthetic "shifts," with the "residuum" under study needing to be reinstated after such "interruptions";

indeed, a "fugitive" and "flickering" rather than an easily "sustained" experiential possibility;

experienced as "elicited"-as emerging in correlation with my repeated/repeatable attempts to reinstate the particular style of experience characterized by the "refraining" concerned; and

not only characterized by the "interruptions" (and "flickering") mentioned above, but itself experienced as an interruption of a deeply sedimented apperceptive style continually "reinstating itself" of its own accord (i.e., my free act of "refraining" is experienced as going "against the grain" of a tendency "automatically" swung into play).

 

B. Let us now follow along with this constitutive tendency, but still within a particular refraining, for this is an experiment in experientially tracking/tracing/feeling (Spüren-cf. Hua 13, 271) a building-up "in the act," in statu nascendi.

What is the next experientially distinguishable stratum in this building-up tendency-what wants to reinstate itself as more "stable" and "persisting," and how can we locate the experiential evidence proper to this stratum?

The stratum to be identified is that of the passive constitution of the somaesthetic field qua persisting "order" for the display of the sensuously "given" array (in this case, the Empfindnisse or sensings); our experiential procedure will involve placing in brackets the familiar "frame" of our own body, epitomized in the general schematic "outline" of a human figure that could be drawn on the page (or cut out of the dough with a cookie cutter)-a familiarity often informed by what we might term the flowing in of an "anatomical apprehension" (cf. Hua 14, 427), including a general schematic articulation of the body into "parts" or "regions," as well as the formal anatomical specification of particular "organs," "bones," "muscles," etc.

Thus the instructions are as follows:

Return to the sensings, but do not "locate" them within the familiar "frame" of the visible outline of the body.

What emerges, and how can it be described?

spread (Ausbreitung, not yet Ausdehnung);

"hovering" borders, rather than sharply defined "edges";

a "thickness" or depth rather than a merely "flat" or "surface" spread;

incipient articulation, not only into "central" and "peripheral" and into "depth" and "surface," but also into "left" and "right" in terms of an implied "midline"-but with the possibility of a "blurring" or "fusing" of "sides" with qualitatively similar filled "spread" (as though I have a "mermaid tail" rather than separate "legs");

(excursus, lifting a hitherto unstated restriction to the "I undergo" without active "I-do": when exploring the underside of your chin with your hand, this field area may be experienced as "above," whereas lying quietly and not touching it, the same region may be experienced as "below")-hence there is the possibility of experiencing the same field from different "standpoints";

episodes of saliencies, with the "envelope" of "emerging" and "decay" often "gradual" rather than sharply delineated, so qualities are experienced as "already" ongoing by virtue of a still-reverberating retentional horizon;

again, however, the possibility of sudden spontaneous shifts, especially where the quality has a character of restriction or "Hemmung," and a concomitant "opening" or other "deformation" of the field occurs;

in addition, the possibility of a global, diffuse "ambience" of the hovering spread (or some region of it), as well as specific "events" or "saliencies" in the emerging articulation of the field;

and on the whole, not only repeatability of access to the "field" ordering the sensings in the hyletic "dimensionality" concerned, but also the possibility of "exploring" the field (e.g., asking "what's going on toward the center?"), as well as simply being aware of "what comes."

 

C. Alternative apprehensions

This experiential experiment consists of allowing the sensations pertaining to this hyletic dimension-the somaesthetic sensings coming to givenness within the somaesthetic field-to be presentive, but in two different ways.

If we allow the familiar bodily "frame" to reinstate itself experientially, we can readily "locate" salient sensings in familiar verbal/experiential terms (e.g., "I feel a patch of 'cold' on the top of my left foot just behind my toes"). This may well yield a "variegated" or "mottled" appearance where some areas "within" the frame are relatively prominently or weakly "filled" with Empfindnisse, others are relatively "blank," some areas are more "distinct" and others more "vague," and so on.

In contrast:

Feel what there is to feel as if this itself is the shape of the felt body.

If the sensings in question are relatively stable, it is even possible to go back and forth between these two different apprehensions "of" the same hyletic configuration.

How can such matters be expressed terminologically? When the sedimented "frame" is in place, the currently felt configuration is a phantom body, a relatively stable appearance "of" a curious experiential object: a "quasi-thing" that we might designate "the" Innenleib. Although this Innenleib can never be completely constituted as a thing, it is a transtemporal identity/unity, a proto­near-thing, if you will, that is accessible only to the person in question (i.e., primordially), but can be given in many multifarious, currently given sensuous appearances over the course of the day (consider, e.g., the felt body in stretching in bed first thing in the morning; the felt body weary from a day of work; the buoyant body felt at a cheerful, excited moment; the felt body curling into itself in pain or grief; the felt body patiently sitting, the felt body walking over uneven sand; and so on . . . ).

This inwardly sensible lived body or Innenleib is in its turn an "inner appearance" of a visible/tangible "Aussenleib." And from here on we could pursue further "building up" strata that would yield the intersubjectively experienceable body, the body as a thing among things, the material/causal body, and the fully naturalized body: the "psychophysical" (neurophysiological, etc.) body as constituted in natural-scientific investigation and mainstream biomedical practice.

But instead, let us return to a final cluster of experiential possibilities.

 

D. Correlations

Sensings are not only presentive-of, but correlate-to. More specifically, we can identify various sorts of correlations obtaining between kinaesthetic possibilities and hyletic "givens."

In the case of somaesthetic sensings, the most obvious type of correlation is the motivational "if-then" such that kinaesthetic "circumstances" stand in correlation to the specific sensuous qualities currently appearing. For example, loosely and freely strumming an invisible guitar, letting the thumb flop up and down, occasions certain sorts of sensings; the inner "gesture" of "letting your weight settle more fully into the surface that supports you" may allow other sorts of sensings to come to appearance; and so on. (Note that just as with the kinaestheses of vision and touch, the if-then relation in question is not a causal one.)

But in addition, there can be "gestures" of "receiving" and "adverting," and "styles" of "performing" these gestures. (Note that the "performing" in question need not be actively/egoically initiated or directed.) For instance, the inner gesture of "undergoing" sensings can be one of "resisting" or "yielding" to them; the gesture of "attending" can be one of "straining to feel" or one of "allowing" and "being open for"; the gesture of adverting can involve "scanning" and "zeroing in on," or it can remain "global" and "diffuse"; one can be "riveted by" a sudden stab of pain, or I can invite you to explore sensings slowly and deliberately-for example, becoming "freely" aware, in a "leisurely" way, of your tongue at this moment, or your throat, or the ongoing feel of your breathing in your torso, and so on. (Note that here I am assuming the familiar language of the bodily "frame"; however, these gestures of awareness can also be studied at the strata of the hyletic dimension, the somaesthetic field, and the currently felt phantom body, as well as at the stratum of the sensuously "available" Innenleib. And in all cases, a subtle, qualitatively variable kinaesthetic "complicity" is correlative to the sensings felt.)

Finally, there is a pair of variations that might be exemplified in the following experiential experiment:

Close your eyes and squeeze them slightly-in one variant, the sensings are "present before" the experiencer, "over-against" ("gegenüber") "me" by a slight but noticeable experiential "distance";

in the other variant, I "inform" the "squeezing" gesture itself with a fully conscious "I-do," living "in" the gesture, "inhabiting" it and "flooding" it with kinaesthetic awareness. Note that it is also possible to "match" ambient or habitual "inner gestures" in this way (cf. Behnke 1988/1995), aligning my "I-can" with what is "already going on"-as when, for example, I take the felt phantom body as the correlate of an inner "gesture" of "making a body," "shaping myself" in just this way (as if I were actively "holding" a pose for a photographer, deliberately and consciously "keeping" my head at just this angle, and so on).

Developing an "appropriate sensibility" for the latter type of variant leads to an appreciation of the "primal motility" that is not "mine" as a "possession," accessible "to" me via presentive sensings, but "mine" not only as individual "act," but as abiding "capability." And with this, we are already spilling over into a further sample investigation (which, however, is relevant to the one just sketched; for example, here I haven't taken into account the role of "holding sway" in general in constituting the "articulated" body-cf., e.g., Hua 15, 255­56).

Thus let us pause to ask: what other problems or projects are immediately horizonally indicated by the sample investigation provided?

 

IV. Some paths not taken

As I have just mentioned, the research presented above stops short of investigating kinaesthetic "processes" considered as sheer "motility," as a "quasi-volitional" moment that is experientially distinguishable from localized "sensations of movement" (see Behnke 2001). And as I have also already indicated at the end of section III.C. in Part Two, the trajectory followed above is interrupted at the stage of the constitution of the Innenleib, which could, however, further be shown to be the primordially accessible appearance of an Aussenleib that in its turn is not only a publicly visible/tangible Leibkörper perceivable by others in the personalistic attitude as expressive of the person whose lived body it is, but is also the basis for the various strata of constitutive accomplishments in which this Leib is apprehended as a naturalized Körper.

But there are other directions indicated by the present project as well. For example, it would be possible to take the localization of kinaesthetic "processes" in "sensations of movement" as a research theme in its own right, rather than performing the abstractive reduction that makes primal motility (the sheer "I can" per se, as distinct from any actual "I do") experientially available. Moreover, one could take up certain examples mentioned in passing in section III.C. of Part Two-the "weary" body, the "buoyant" body, the "grieving" body, and so on-and turn to the theme of the "affective body" (which would inevitably lead to descriptions of the way the "affective body" is geared in with a "physiognomic world"). But even mentioning the latter possibility already brings up certain questions of terminological clarification already alluded to in section I.D. of Part One above.

The decision to use the term "hylé" in the sample investigation offered in Part Two evoked a lively discussion from participants at the original "Reach of Reflection" conference. Here one might, for example, adduce the critique of the "hylomorphic" scheme as this critique is carried out in, for instance, Sokolowski 1964, as well as the critical discussion in Gurwitsch's 1929 essay concerning the relation between Gestalt theory and the phenomenology of Husserl's Ideas I (see Gurwitsch 1966, especially 253ff.). On the other hand, one might argue that Husserl's notion of "hylé" undermines, rather than perpetuating, the notion of atomistic "sense data" current in his time (see Lingis 1970, 80ff.), then go on to trace out the expanded way the term "hylé" functions in Husserl's later work (see, e.g., Depraz 2000). And this discussion could be prolonged by turning to other scholarly sources, as well as by appealing to a variety of experiential examples.

But suppose I had chosen to avoid the historical freight of the term "hylé" by using the term "affection" instead. In this case, yet another set of ambiguities could have emerged in the discussion, due to the circumstance that the notion of "affection" works in at least four distinguishable "registers" that are often conflated. 1) As a member either of the series "knowing, willing, feeling" or of the series "perceiving, judging, feeling," it is roughly equivalent to the "emotional" dimension or constituent of human life mentioned above. 2) In another signification-one we might see as akin to the notion of an "impression"-the term "affection" signals encounter with alterity, with a "given" that is foreign to the I, yet brings the I into direct contract with what is radically other than the I. 3) A further nuance would equate this "affection" with an "undergoing," as distinct from any "doing"; hence for some authors, "affection" signals radical passivity in contradistinction to any possible activity. 4) Finally, there is a technical Husserlian sense according to which "affection" is a "zero" of "attention," and what is usually emphasized in discussions of this sense of "affection" is a temporal priority of "affection" (including "auto-affection," in contrast to the "hetero-affection" emphasized in sense 2) above) such that any reflective thematization already comes "too late," leading, for example, to an insistence on the "pre-reflective" status of "self-affection" (cf., e.g., Zahavi 1999). Thus here too, any descriptive work that begins with the notion of an "affective body" could lead to a lively discussion motivated by the multiple senses of the term, as well as by the multiple ways in which our ongoing, dynamic, implicit experiential "intricacy" (to borrow Gendlin's term) responds to the intersecting distinctions our language proposes to it.

Again, however, in the context of the research-oriented attitude exemplified in the present report, the ultimate touchstone should be the experiential evidence proper to the matters themselves, for any words spoken without this turn to Evidenz are, as Husserl says (1939, 336/1975, 57), "just so much hot air."

Epilogue

I close by summarizing some of the practical difficulties I encountered in carrying out our assigned task of identifying outstanding issues to be advanced phenomenologically and making a start on one such issue through some original phenomenological investigation of the matters themselves.

1) As I have indicated in the Prologue, my overview of outstanding and emerging themes is provisional and situated, reflecting my own motivations and interests. Even given this limitation, however, I am all too aware of the halo of "more that could be said" haunting Part One of the presentation, for issues pertaining to embodiment are implicated in all spheres of experience: the theme is still so rich that a single chapter, or one short presentation, simply cannot do justice to the topic. In addition, the supporting references have been confined for the most part to works available in English; a broader "retrospective" survey of work published in a greater range of languages would yield a correspondingly richer account of emerging lines of investigation that have yet to be carried out fully.

2) Moreover, in the course of attempting to give literary expression to the issues identified for Part One, I continually found myself starting to work them out so as to be able to make the points at issue as clear as possible. In other words, it was difficult to state an issue adequately without already beginning the process of resolving it. This, of course, is an age-old paradox-there's something needed here, something missing, but I can't tell you what it is until I find it! Nevertheless, this problem functioned as a practical constraint in identifying and organizing "issues" for further phenomenological investigation.

3) I am committed to doing phenomenology, i.e., to original phenomenological investigation of matters themselves. But I find that the lived activity of doing actual phenomenological research has its own dynamics and pitfalls. First of all, it is difficult to know in advance if one can do justice to a particular topic within the limits of the format available. This is due, in part, to the circumstance that each descriptive endeavor opens a horizon of further, related descriptive tasks, so that the potential "findings" continually transgress the limits of the occasion. Thus what has been said in Part Two is also haunted by its own horizon of "more that could be done." Moreover, even if one is originally motivated by a particular "issue" to be "settled," if one truly lets oneself be led by the research-which means being led by the phenomena themselves-the research findings may not only transform the problem one started with in mid-stream, as it were, but turn out to be relevant to many other issues as well. Yet the "issues of relevance" that emerge may not match the way the initial "issues of concern" were formulated: the research itself retroactively shifts the way the field to which it contributes is articulated. Thus in order to make the "chapter" stronger, one is tempted to revise the "agenda" stated in Part One so that it better foreshadows the "exemplification" in Part Two. In other words, I feel-as I usually do-a tension between producing a coherent "paper" compatible with the model of a "philosophical text," and contributing a faithful "research report."

4) For me, however, there is yet another tension between the initial experience of participating in a conference, offering this work in the presence of specific colleagues, and the subsequent requirement of making a written contribution to a "collective" volume whose authors come together only in the virtual space of an electronic publication and whose audience could be anywhere on earth-perhaps including readers whose social situation, intellectual commitments, and bodily experiences are quite different from my own.

Since I do not know in advance who my readers will be-just that each reader is going to be situated as well as individuated by virtue of the embodiment we share (even if we "live" it in many different ways)-I have made the strategic decision simply to let the written version of this contribution reflect the style and atmosphere of the conference presentation as closely as possible, so that here too, it is not a matter of words marshaled in service of the genre of a "philosophical text" addressed to everyone and to no one, but something more like a traveler's report of something that happened in Florida one January day early in phenomenology's second century. For what I attempted then and there was to create a social occasion for a genuine phenomenological demonstration, conducted leibhaft-face-to-face, in interkinaesthetic immediacy, growing older together. In short, I attempted to do this work "live" and in company, not only in order to remind us all that phenomenology is not solely a textual tradition, but to exemplify my conviction that no matter how important a phenomenology "of" embodiment may be, it is ultimately even more crucial to embody phenomenology as a living tradition of research and discussion.

Yet for phenomenology to continue to survive as a generative tradition at all, written words too are indispensable, for they not only travel further and more freely than our embodied voices do, but outlive us, reverberating beyond our own last horizons of silence. Thus these situated words are offered in a spirit of trust that "words," per se, can indeed "reach" others, and move them, and be taken up and transformed in the process, so that our tradition is not only preserved, but enriched for generations to come.

 

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